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UNDERSTANDING OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE 
ADVANTAGE: THE ROLE OF TRANSACTION COSTS  
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
To add insight in new value creation, opportunity discovery should be integrated with 
strategic management theory. Based on the resource-based view and the economics of 
property rights we build a framework that accomplishes this. Our key argument is that 
property rights and transaction costs are important antecedents of opportunity 
discovery. We identify two mechanisms that establish this influence, and examine 
alternative ways in knowledge, transaction costs, and property rights influence 
opportunity discovery and sustainable advantage.  
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On November 24th, 1874 United States Patent #157,124 was granted to Joseph Glidden of 
DeKalb, Illinois for improved barbed wire fencing. Glidden’s patent was only the culmination of 
a series of nine patents for improvements to wire fencing that were granted by the U.S. Patent 
Office to American inventors, beginning with Michael Kelly in November 1868 and ending with 
Glidden’s patent (McCallum, 1965) which quickly became dominant. To be sure, wire fencing 
had been used for a very long time. However, property rights over livestock were less secure, as 
wire fencing would often break under the impact of heavy livestock pressing against the fencing. 
This would not happen with barbed wire, and the costs at which property rights to livestock could 
be protected therefore fell dramatically (Dennen, 1976; Anderson & Hill, 2004).  
The new fencing innovation set in motion dramatic path-dependent processes of 
institutional, organizational and technological innovations throughout the Plains. Indeed, it has 
been argued that the emergence of barbed wire was as important a factor behind changing the life 
at the Plains as the rifle, telegraph, and locomotive (Webb, 1931; Hill, 1969). Arguably, barbed 
wire was the crucial factor underlying the transformation from ranching to farming, as the new 
fencing protected crops from livestock and meant that fields could be used as pasture after the 
harvest. Barbed wire ended the great cattle drives and the need for branding. Cattle could be kept 
at a limited area, which greatly increased the value to agricultural firms (farms) of this resource 
(Webb, 1931). It prompted experimentation with new more valuable resources, notably the 
Shorthorn, Angus, and the Hereford, as substitutes for the tougher, but less valuable Longhorn, as 
well as with the uses of land.  
This example implies that resources (e.g., land) hold a number of potential uses, 
characteristics, etc., and that some of these “attributes” may not yet have been discovered. 
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Changes in the (transaction) costs of defining and enforcing property rights, induced by 
technological or legal changes or brought about by entrepreneurs themselves, alert entrepreneurs 
to the discovery of new potentially valuable resource attributes. Such discoveries may translate 
into sustainable advantages. We integrate these implications with strategic management theory, 
providing a novel theoretical account of opportunity discovery and the competitive implications 
thereof.   
We build on the resource-based notion of firms as bundles of heterogeneous resources 
(Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991), but place this notion in a dynamic context (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2003). The full set of resource attributes are not known apriori; instead, resource attributes must 
be discovered (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Denrell et al., 2003). The fundamental argument of this 
paper is that such discovery is influenced by transaction costs. Two mechanisms link transaction 
costs and opportunity discovery. The first mechanism is the one implied by the above example: 
transaction costs determine how well defined and enforced property rights to resource attributes 
are;  in turn, this influences the value that entrepreneurial resource owners expect to appropriate, 
and therefore their incentives to engage in opportunity discovery (Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005). 
We call this mechanism the “appropriability mechanism.” Second, entrepreneurial experience 
influences opportunity discovery (e.g., Shane, 2000). However, experience (also) emerges from 
resource learning, that is, entrepreneurs’ learning about the attributes of resources (Mahoney, 
1995). Such learning entails transaction costs, for example, the costs of measuring the 
productivity potential of employees. The transaction costs that entrepreneurs face influence their 
resource learning, introduce path dependence in such learning (Argyris & Liebeskind, 1999; 
Argyris & Mayer, 2007), and therefore influence which opportunities will be discovered. We call 
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this the “resource learning mechanism.” Both mechanisms imply that the level and direction of 
opportunity discovery is influenced by transaction costs.  
This paper is located in the intersection of the economics of property rights (EPR) and the 
resource-based view (RBV), an emerging theoretical lens in strategic management research (e.g., 
Teece, 1986; Mahoney, 1992; Oxley, 1999; Foss & Foss, 2005; Kim & Mahoney, 2002, 2006).  
The argument that transaction costs and experience impact opportunity discovery contributes to 
the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Kirzner, 1973; Shane, 2000; Shepherd & Tienne, 2005), for 
example, by suggesting answers to key issues in the entrepreneurship literature concerning the 
emergence and locus of entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Moreover, 
links are forged with the strategic management literature: We explore how opportunity discovery 
may translate into sustained heterogeneity, and thereby respond to recent calls in the strategy 
literature for understanding rent-creation as a dynamic process (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; 
Lippman & Rumelt, 2003a&b) and for integrating opportunity discovery with the RBV (e.g., 
Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b).  
 
OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY AND EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE:  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Opportunity Discovery 
 Opportunity (or entrepreneurial) discovery consists of actions initiated by individuals 
(Schumpeter, 1911; Kirzner, 1973; Shane, 2000) or teams (Penrose, 1959; Kor, 2003) directed at 
identifying a hitherto neglected opportunity. An opportunity is a situation “… in which new 
goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at a price 
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greater than their cost of production” (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000: 220). Opportunity 
discovery may consist of the discovery of new resource attributes or features of organization that 
help to serve market needs and wants in a better way (Schumpeter, 1911). For example, 
individuals or firms that introduce new improved contractual designs, sorting systems, 
organization structures, etc. may realize an entrepreneurial return that are based on the lowering 
of transaction costs. Opportunity discovery may result in the formation of new firms (e.g., 
Knight, 1921; Ardichivili et al., 2003), or may take place inside existing firms (e.g., Miller, 
1983), or may not involve firms at all (Kirzner, 1973). Moreover, entrepreneurial discoveries can 
have productive, unproductive, or destructive results (Baumol, 1990), depending on their impact 
on overall value creation. Unproductive entrepreneurship leaves overall value creation 
unaffected, while destructive entrepreneurship is solely aimed at capturing value created by 
others agents through other means than bargaining and competition (e.g., new ways of lobbying 
or rent-seeking, cf. Baumol, 1990). The focus is here on value-creating opportunity discovery.   
 To some writers (notably Kirzner, 1973, 1997), the discovery of opportunities is costless, 
and the search, discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities are essentially one 
process. To us, in contrast, opportunity discovery requires significant knowledge, effort and 
investment, and it makes analytical sense to distinguish different phases in the opportunity 
discovery process. Nevertheless, the relevant phases are strongly overlapping, as stressed in much 
recent creativity research (e.g., Finke et al., 1992; Runco & Chand, 1995). This overlap implies 
that opportunity discovery may be understood as a continuous interplay between the phases, the 
generation of candidate ideas constantly interacting with evaluation. Except for cases of pure 
arbitrage, opportunity discovery implies that entrepreneurs have to engage in speculation 
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concerning the appropriable value that will result from the discovery (Knight, 1921; Kaish and 
Gilad, 1991; Eckardt and Shane, 2003; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b; Denrell et al., 2003). 
 Focusing on opportunity discovery as the central construct is consistent with an emergent 
research agenda in the entrepreneurship literature, as summarized by Shane (2003: 4-5):  
The academic field of entrepreneurship incorporates, in its domain, explanations for 
why, when and how entrepreneurial opportunities exist; the sources of those 
opportunities and the forms that they take; the processes of opportunity discovery and 
evaluation; the acquisition of resources for the exploitation of these opportunities; the 
act of opportunity exploitation; why, when, and how some individuals and not others 
discover, evaluate, gather resources for and exploit opportunities; the strategies used to 
pursue opportunities; and the organizing efforts to exploit them. 
The answers given to these key questions in the entrepreneurship field have increasingly 
concentrated on experiential knowledge.  
Experiential Knowledge 
  An influential view in the entrepreneurship literature is that opportunity discovery depends 
critically on the alertness of the entrepreneur (Kirzner, 1973; Busenitz, 1996; Shane, 2003). The 
recent opportunity discovery literature concentrates on operationalizing alertness and identifying 
its antecedents, concentrating on expected rewards and prior, mainly experiential, knowledge 
(Busenitz, 1996; Venkataraman, 1997; Krueger, 2000; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Gaglio & 
Katz, 2001; Shane, 2000, 2003). For example, Shane (2000, 2003) builds a strong case that 
experiential knowledge moderates the relation from technological invention to the recognition of 
a potential opportunity, and that it furthermore moderates the relation from the recognized 
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opportunity to specific approaches to exploiting that opportunity. In the literature, experiential 
knowledge is taken to include such things as “prior knowledge about markets,” “prior knowledge 
about how to serve markets,” “prior knowledge of customer problems,” etc. (e.g., Shane, 2000).  
 The emphasis on experiential knowledge harmonizes with recent firm-level work on 
opportunity discovery (usually conceptualized as innovativeness) and its experiential 
antecendents (Helfat, 1997; Mosakowski, 1998; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Matsusaka, 2001; 
Mitchell et al., 2002; Lumpkin & Lichtenstein, 2005). However, in this literature, experiential 
knowledge concerns the understanding of the uses, functionalities, services, characteristics, etc. 
of firm resources, that is, knowledge of resource attributes (Foss & Foss, 2005). Such knowledge 
emerges from “resource learning” (Penrose, 1959; Spender, 1992; Mahoney, 1995), that is, 
human resources’ learning about the services of other resources (Spender, 1992), implying that 
they know “… more accurately the relative productive performances of those resources” 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 94; emph. in orig.).  Resource learning may involve learning-by-
doing or more deliberate experimentation with resources, as well as processes of search and 
information acquisition.  
 The outcome of resource learning is experiential knowledge that in turn influences 
opportunity discovery. Experiential knowledge influences opportunity discovery for the 
following reasons. Entrepreneurs need to categorize and describe items (specifically items that 
can serve as an indication of an opportunity) in a relevant information domain, in order to build a 
workable representation of that domain that can assist them in opportunity discovery. People who 
work in ill-structured decision situations ⎯ such as those that characterize opportunity discovery 
(Knight, 1921) ⎯ require a representation that identifies and even amplifies relevant information 
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so as to allow them to discover discrepancies between the world and the representation that is 
used as an action guide (Walsh, 1995; Gaglio & Katz, 2001). Experiential knowledge shapes the 
building of categories and representations that assist entrepreneurs in decision-making (Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980; Abelson & Black, 1986; Day & Lord, 1992; Gaglio &  Katz, 2001).  A deep level of 
expertise within a certain information domain allows people to faster categorize ill-structured 
problems. Also, deep knowledge may provide an entrepreneur with more detailed ways of 
understanding and describing his or her resources (Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994; Rensch et al., 
1994), and thereby assist the discovery of new resource attributes.  
   Experiential knowledge from resource learning is fundamental in the initial phase of 
venture formation in which entrepreneurs may only be able to identify some elements of an 
opportunity and need to invoke imagination, and search for and process information in order to 
more fully identify and evaluate the opportunity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Ardichvili et al., 
2003). Moreover, the knowledge that entrepreneurs, or entrepreneurial teams (Penrose, 1959; 
Kor, 2003), acquire through resource learning may influence their knowledge structures in ways 
that enable them to identify opportunities faster or more consistently within a particular 
information domain (e.g., relating to a particular bundle of resources) than those who do not 
posses this particular knowledge (Shane, 2000; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Thus, experiential 
knowledge from resource learning may also underlie path-dependent trajectories of discovery in 
established firms (Helfat, 1994; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000), and be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage for such firms (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Mahoney, 1995).  
Cognition and Incentives in Opportunity Discovery 
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 The emphasis on experiential knowledge in the entrepreneurship literature represents a 
cognitive focus on opportunity discovery: The main emphasis is on the discovery part, and the 
actual evaluation and eventual seizing of an opportunity, including the appropriation of returns, is 
often less emphasized (cf. Kirzner, 1993, 1997). This neglect is potentially misleading, because 
cognitive science implies that there is a strong and ongoing process of feedback from evaluation 
to discovery (cf. Finke et al., 1992, Runco & Chand, 1995). In other words, expectations of 
returns from opportunities influence the discovery process itself, influencing the intensity with 
which opportunities will be pursued and the directions in which discovery efforts will take. For 
example, entrepreneurs or firms may well possess the experiential knowledge that enables their 
scanning of certain emerging technological fields in search of discoveries. However, if expected 
returns in some of these fields are highly uncertain because of weak enforcement of property 
rights to discoveries within the field, this may negatively impact discovery efforts (Cohen & 
Klepper, 1996). Expected returns are influenced by assessments of the costs at which property 
rights to discoveries can be delineated and enforced (and possibly also exchanged). These costs 
are transaction costs. For example, if transaction costs are sufficiently large, they may provide a 
powerful dis-incentive to discovery. This indicates that it is worthwhile exploring the role of 
transaction costs and property rights in the process of opportunity discovery in order to provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of the antecedents of opportunity discovery,  
 
LINKING TRANSACTION COSTS AND OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY: 
APPROPRIABILITY AND RESOURCE LEARNING MECHANISMS 
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Transaction costs have seldom been explicitly related to opportunity discovery, and there is little 
or no theoretical and empirical work that systematically explores the relation (but see Michael 
[2007] for a transaction cost analysis of the marketing side of entrepreneurial ventures). The 
following discussion conceptualizes the two mechanisms that link transaction costs and 
opportunity discovery, the “appropriability mechanism” and the “resource learning mechanism.” 
We make use of the economics of property rights (the EPR) to frame the discussion. 
Attributes and Opportunity Discovery 
 The EPR begins from the notion that most resources have multiple attributes (Coase, 1960; 
Cheung, 1970; Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1988), including the different functionalities and 
services/uses (Penrose, 1959) that the resources can offer. For example, a copying machine is a 
multi-attribute resource in the sense that it can be used in different time periods, by many 
different persons, for many different types of copying work, can be purchased in different colors, 
sizes, etc. Building on the EPR, Foss & Foss (2005) argue that the understanding of resource 
value is improved by conceptualizing resources as bundles of attributes to which property rights 
may be delineated, enforced and exchanged. This builds on the recognition that it is not resources 
themselves that are valuable, but their attributes. Understanding attributes and the extent to which 
property rights can be delineated, enforced and exchanged add increased insight into resource 
value and value appropriation. 
 Adopting an attributes perspective not only yields additional insight into resource value and 
value appropriation; it also links opportunity discovery and resources. Thus, opportunity 
discovery may be conceptualized in terms of the discovery of new valued resource attributes. 
Individual resources may have a multitude of undiscovered attributes, some of which may be 
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associated with appropriable value (Demsetz, 1988; Denrell et al., 2003). A determinant of the 
appropriable value from newly discovered resource attributes is whether the discoverer can 
delineate and enforce property rights to his new discovery. In turn, this depends on the 
transaction cost of delineating and enforcing property rights.  
The Appropriability Mechanism 
 A crucial insight of the EPR is that transactions involve the exchange of property rights 
rather than the exchange of goods per se (Coase, 1960, 1988). Hence, the unit of analysis in this 
perspective is the individual property right. Property rights consist of the right to consume, obtain 
income from, and alienate resource attributes (Alchian, 1965). The EPR dissociates property 
rights from legal connotations, so that an (economic) property right speaks more to the actual 
ability of an agent to consume, obtain income from, and alienate resource attributes than to 
whether he is legally entitled to do so (cf. Barzel, 1997). (Obviously, however, such ability is 
likely to be influenced by the extent to which property rights are legally enforceable). In this 
perspective, transaction costs can be defined in a consistent manner, namely as the costs of 
delineating, enforcing and exchanging property rights (Coase, 1960; Barzel, 1997). Property 
rights may be enforced by the state as well as by private means (Barzel, 1997), as in the case of 
the barbed wire example. When rights are perfectly enforced, owners can completely hinder non-
payers from taking possession of, imitating, or consuming any resource attributes that they hold 
property rights to. That is, property rights and their enforcement influence the value entrepreneurs 
can appropriate from exploration of different resource attributes.  
 Given that discovery and evaluation of opportunities are closely intertwined processes, 
transaction costs influence which attributes will be subject to discovery. Thus, the perceived cost 
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of delineating and enforcing property rights to newly discovered attributes are likely to influence 
discovery efforts in predictable directions. As a general matter, “… entrepreneurial energy and 
innovation are starkly biased towards the creation of those surpluses which can be appropriated 
by the innovator” (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003a: 924; our emphasis; cf. also Shepherd & DeTienne, 
2005). This link between transaction costs and discovery is the “appropriability mechanism.” 
 To illustrate, consider the barbed wire example that introduced this paper. Prior to the 
advent of barbed wire, the cost of enforcing property rights to cattle and land were such that 
ranchers did not seriously consider experimenting with introducing the Shorthorn, Angus, and 
Hereford on the plains. The cost of enforcing property rights to these attributes of land and cattle 
were prohibitive. The changing property rights structure implied by the advent of barbed wire had 
the effect of drastically lowering enforcement cost, changing the space for opportunity discovery. 
As another example, the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty implied a 
significant removal of uncertainty with respect to what was the law in biotechnology patenting. 
This drastically changed the appropriability regime confronting a number of industries (Pisano, 
1990), and made exploring genetic engineering and its uses in these industries substantially more 
attractive. The relevant space of potential opportunity discovery was expanded as a result of the 
delineation and enforcement of property rights to biotech research results. 
 Property rights to resource attributes (or bundles of attributes) are seldom perfectly 
enforced, as owners face transaction costs of delineating and protecting property rights to such 
attributes. Some resource attributes will optimally not be protected against non-payers’ attempts 
at appropriating value generated by the attributes (Barzel, 1997). For example, resources are not 
likely to be completely protected against imitation; contracts may not completely safeguard 
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against hold-up; supermarkets do not monitor and price the parking spaces they offer customers 
(effectively inviting non-owners to capture these attributes); etc. Such imperfect protection of 
property rights to valuable attributes gives rise to capture by non-owners in ways that dissipate 
value. Capture takes many forms: while value erosion from imitation (Barney, 1991) may be the 
relevant mechanism of capture in the case of the biotechnology example above, the barbed wire 
example suggests other, more direct, kinds of capture of property rights in the form of theft. 
Another example is hold-up (Williamson, 1996). However, the underlying logic is the same: 
property rights to certain resource attributes are captured, and the “victim” is not compensated 
(Barzel, 1997). Note in passing that an implication of this reasoning is that the reduction of 
transaction costs by means of new ways of delineating (e.g., better ways of measuring attributes), 
protecting (e.g., improved protection of business secretes, better ways of protecting credit card 
information in virtual exchanges, barbed wire,), and exchanging (e.g., introducing internet trade) 
property rights may constitute entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 In sum, the appropriability mechanism implies that transaction costs help defining the 
relevant space for opportunity discovery: the transaction costs of enforcing property rights to 
newly discovered resource attributes moderate the relation between experiential knowledge and 
opportunity discovery by influencing the distribution of perceived costs and benefits in the space 
of discoveries.  
The Resource Learning Mechanism 
 While experiential knowledge matters to the discovery of opportunities, building such 
knowledge is costly.  Resource learning may imply experimenting with resources, combining and 
recombining them, and learning about their attributes in the process (Penrose, 1959; Orr, 1996). 
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Thus, resource learning emerges from M&As (Matsusaka, 2001), the ramp-up and calibration of 
factory production (Foss, 2001; Stiglitz & Heine, 2007), interaction between employees and 
managers (Argote, 1999), and other processes that result in the discovery of new resource 
attributes. These processes are costly, and some of the relevant costs are transaction costs, such as 
the costs of negotiating M&As, contracting (and re-contracting) over resource uses in strategic 
alliances, delineating decision rights over corporate resources inside the firm, building 
information revelation mechanisms that can reveal the relevant types of human capital, etc. While 
no direct estimates of the transaction costs of resource learning appear to exist, there are reasons 
to believe that such costs are often substantial; think of expenses on corporate lawyers in 
connection with M&As or the recruitment costs of hiring new employees. 
 To further exemplify, consider the problem of how to design and coordinate a system of 
productive tasks with many task complementarities. Designers are not likely to have full 
knowledge ex ante about, for example, the optimal sequencing of tasks, even if they perfectly 
know the functionalities of physical resources.  For example, the problem of defining an optimal 
sequence of tasks in a complex system of production may require more calculation capacity than 
is available in a super-computer (Galloway, 1996: 64). Some kind of experimental, iterative 
learning process is then required to solve the problem. In a world of complete knowledge, perfect 
rationality and zero transaction cost, all rights to all uses of all assets could be perfectly specified 
ex ante in contracts; there would be no need to learn about resource attributes. However, in a 
more realistic setting, understanding the various ways in which tasks may be sequenced, the 
physical equipment used, etc. requires an iterative process of specifying resource attributes and 
trying out solutions. Costs of defining resource uses, measuring the productivity of resources, 
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coordinating uses, etc. are incurred. If these costs are very high, it may only pay to perform a few 
iterations before a solution is decided upon. Little experiential knowledge is built concerning the 
properties of the production system. In contrast, lower costs may lead to faster and more resource 
learning, and a solution that is closer to the optimum.  In sum, transaction costs directly influence 
resource learning processes, because the expected gains will be balanced against the (transaction 
and other) costs of resource learning.  
 
OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE ADVANTAGE:  
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Benchmarks  
 While experiential knowledge, the appropriability mechanism, and the resource learning 
mechanism add insight into opportunity discovery, do they also influence how and to what extent 
opportunity discovery translates into sustainable advantage? Moreover, while experiential 
learning and the two mechanisms have so far been treated separately, it seems warranted to 
consider the realistic situations where they interact.  
 To examine these issues in greater detail, we make use of (“unrealistic”) benchmark 
situations where the effects of experiential knowledge, the appropriability mechanism and the 
resource learning mechanism on opportunity discovery and advantage are nullified. The analysis 
is then complicated by sequentially “switching on” experiential knowledge and the two 
mechanisms. The purpose of this exercise is to be able to more clearly study the effects on certain 
dependent variables (e.g., opportunity discovery) of certain independent variables (e.g., 
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transaction costs), eliminating other influences. Thus, one can consider the direct effects of the 
independent variables as a precursor to understanding combined or interaction effects 
 Such thought experiments are commonplace in economics (see Hahn [1973] for a 
methodological explication and defence of its use), and are also sometimes used by management 
scholars. For example, Barney (1991) begins his exposition of the RBV by analyzing what will 
happen to sustained competitive advantages in a setting where firms control identical resource 
bundles, then gradually introducing antecedents of sustained competitive advantage to finally 
arrive at the full set of jointly necessary conditions for such advantage. Thus, Barney begins from 
an extreme benchmark, and gradually relaxes the constraining assumptions, introducing greater 
realism.  
 We specifically ask how property rights/transaction costs and knowledge separately and 
interactively influence opportunity discovery and sustained advantage. The result is a clearer 
understanding of the operation of the mechanisms that are at work. The independent variables 
that we here consider as determinants of opportunity discovery and sustained advantage are 
property rights and transaction costs and (experiential) knowledge. We abstract from other 
potentially relevant independent variables, for example, risk preferences, personality traits, 
network position, etc.  
 Blueprint technology. Two analytical devices are used to characterize the benchmarks. The 
first one is that of “blueprint technology” (Robinson, 1933; Demsetz, 1991), that is, the 
assumption that knowledge that can be used by any one entrepreneur can also be used by any 
other entrepreneur. In the simplest versions of production theory in economics (Robinson, 1933), 
productive knowledge is a pure public good, that is, it is non-rivalrous in use and it is impossible 
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to exclude any non-payers. We do not adopt this extreme assumption. As understood here, 
blueprint knowledge only means that the transfer of knowledge is not impeded by imperfect and 
differential absorptive capacity on the part of entrepreneurs. It may be possible to exclude non-
payers depending on the (transaction) costs of doing so. The opposite of blueprint technology is 
that knowledge exchange and transfer among entrepreneurs is limited because of absorptive 
capacity gaps. 
 Zero transaction costs. The second device we make use of is that of the zero transaction 
cost setting introduced by Coase (1960). Coase (1988) and Barzel (1997) argue that the 
assumption of zero transaction costs means that property rights to all valuable resource attributes 
are perfectly delineated, enforced, and exchanged at zero cost. At issue, however, is what is 
meant by “all valuable resource attributes.” Coase (1988) interprets the zero cost condition as 
implying omniscience, so that zero transaction costs literally mean that all resource attributes 
(including all future resource uses) are known to decision-makers. This corresponds to a general 
equilibrium model with a full set of inter-temporal prices (Denrell et al., 2003). In such a setting, 
there is, of course, no scope for opportunity discovery. However, other writers, with whom we 
side, argue that opportunity discovery can take place even if transaction costs are zero: that 
existing transactions are costless to transact does not logically imply that all potential transactions 
have been discovered (cf. Kirzner, 1973). Accordingly, the zero transaction cost condition does 
not rule out opportunity discovery that is rooted in privately held experiential knowledge (cf. 
Makowski & Ostroy, 2001). However, it does rule out costs of writing and enforcing contracts 
involving knowledge transactions. That is, only differences in absorptive capacity may impede 
knowledge transactions when transaction costs are zero. Moreover, in the zero transaction cost 
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benchmark, the appropriability mechanism and the resource learning mechanism are eliminated 
in the sense that transaction costs cannot be antecedents of opportunity discovery under this 
benchmark.  
 Four cases.  The two benchmark situations can now applied to generate four cases, 
depending on whether we “switch on” or “switch off” transaction costs and knowledge. 
Specifically, we consider four combinations of the determinants of opportunity discovery and 
sustainable advantage. These are [zero transaction costs, blueprint knowledge], [zero transaction 
costs, non-blueprint knowledge], [positive transaction costs, blueprint knowledge], and [positive 
transaction costs, non-blueprint knowledge]. For each one of these combinations, we discuss the 
nature of discoverable opportunities, value creation and appropriation, the role of opportunity 
discovery in creating resource heterogeneity, and the organization of opportunity discovery and 
exploitation. We focus on these dependent variables because they are crucially important in 
entrepreneurship and strategic management research. See Table 1.  
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 1 Here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Case A: Zero Transaction Costs and Blueprint Knowledge 
 Opportunity discovery. Kirzner (1973) argues that even in the model of the market of 
economics textbooks, there is a need for the entrepreneur as an equilibrating force. This textbook 
model is one in which transaction costs are zero and where knowledge is blueprint. Even in this 
extreme case opportunity discovery can take, namely in the form of the discovery of new 
resource attributes and resource learning (recall that there is no assumption here that 
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entrepreneurs are omniscient). The entrepreneur’s incentives to engage in opportunity discovery 
and resource learning arise from the discrepancies in earnings from exploiting resource attributes 
that he has already discovered and exploiting newly discovered attributes. However, neither 
transaction costs, nor barriers to knowledge utilization will influence which resource attributes 
entrepreneurs discover. Property rights can be delineated and enforced at zero cost, which 
eliminates all concerns of capture, including capture from imitation. This nullifies the 
appropriability mechanism. Also, there are no transaction costs that hinder resource learning; this 
mechanism, too, is nullified.  
 Value creation and appropriation. The zero transaction cost assumption and the 
assumption that prior knowledge can be fully absorbed by any entrepreneur imply that any value 
creating discovery will be utilized to its full economic capacity (i.e., where the marginal net 
benefit from further utilization is zero) (Mosakowski & Ostroy, 2001). Over time, total value 
creation will be maximized because of the absence of transaction costs and barriers to knowledge 
absorption. While value creation will be independent of bargaining power (cf. the Coase 
Theorem, Coase, 1960), bargaining power will determine how much value entrepreneurs and 
factor owners will appropriate. Specifically, how much value an entrepreneur who makes a 
discovery can appropriate depends on the bargaining game among the entrepreneur, those who 
benefit from the discovery, and those who hold property rights to complementary resources that 
are needed to exploit the discovery (cf. Teece, 1986). There is no a priori reason to impute all or 
even the largest amount of the created value to the entrepreneur.  
 Path-dependence and sustainable heterogeneity. Entrepreneurs may start out with 
heterogeneous bundles of resources attributes which results in heterogeneous resource learning. 
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However, as there are no transaction costs of selling knowledge and no barriers to absorbing 
knowledge, no entrepreneur will be locked into a path of inferior resource learning and 
opportunity discovery: “best-practice knowledge” can be purchased at factor markets. In fact, 
other kinds of path dependence are also ruled out by virtue of the zero transaction cost condition, 
as optimal solutions will always be negotiated when there are no obstacles (i.e., transaction costs) 
to doing so. Thus, no strategic issues relating to lock-in to inferior products or technical solutions 
can arise.   
 The other side of the coin is that long-lasting resource heterogeneity among entrepreneurs 
cannot be an outcome of initial knowledge endowments or opportunity discovery, because all 
knowledge and all discoveries will be made available on the relevant factor markets. When 
entrepreneurs hold secure property rights to the discoveries they make, they will be best off by 
letting others share in the discovery (against compensation). Factor heterogeneity stemming from 
initial knowledge endowments or discoveries cannot persist in this situation. Moreover, as factor 
markets perfectly reflect the expected value of resource attributes and of resource learning (the 
foundation for the discovery of new attributes), no entrepreneur can consistently outperform the 
market. Thus, the absence of costs or cognitive constraints on the movement of resources, 
including knowledge, limit the causes of sustainable heterogeneity, and therefore differential 
rents (Barney, 1991), to initial endowments of non-reproducible resources (e.g., location).  
 Economic organization.  As the resource learning mechanism and the appropriability 
mechanisms are nullified, the process of resource learning is independent of transaction costs, 
and can be organized through market contracts at zero cost. Firms as governance structures have 
no particular advantages concerning the organization of resource learning processes (Williamson, 
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1996). Relatedly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to control a resource or resource bundle by 
means of holding ownership title; costless bargaining and contracting over resource attributes can 
substitute for ownership (Hart, 1995). Thus, firms will not arise as means to secure value 
appropriation (as in Liebeskind, 1996). 
Case B: Zero Transaction Costs and Non-Blueprint Knowledge 
 Opportunity discovery. When knowledge is non-blueprint, entrepreneurs will have less 
access to knowledge than in Case A. The entrepreneur’s own accumulated experience is an 
important antecedent of opportunity discovery (Shane, 2000, 2003). The non-blueprint nature of 
knowledge in this case is a force limiting overall opportunity discovery. However, entrepreneurs 
may gain by developing means of reducing buyers’ knowledge requirements. Thus, entrepreneurs 
may direct opportunity discovery toward making knowledge “more tradable” by embodying it in 
products, equipment, or in modular components which do not require much knowledge on the 
part of the recipient (Demsetz, 1991). Thus, a consequence of the changing nature of knowledge 
is that the nature of the opportunity discovery process changes.  
Value creation and appropriation. In terms of assumptions made, Case B perhaps best 
approximates the RBV (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993): while the RBV pays little attention to 
transaction costs, differential knowledge resources are central in this view. However, the explicit 
introduction of opportunity discovery, a phenomenon not yet incorporated with the RBV, means 
that strategic challenges go beyond those traditionally identified in the RBV. Because in this case 
all transaction costs are zero, and property rights can therefore be costlessly protected, threats to 
value appropriation from imitation, opportunistic hold-up and the like are non-existent. As in the 
RBV entrepreneurs may face potential substitutability threats; however, with ongoing opportunity 
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discovery entrepreneurs face the threat of total value erosion, as completely different bodies of 
knowledge and complementary resource may serve a given market need in a new and very 
different way. This is a serious concern to an entrepreneur as he or she cannot insure his 
investments in knowledge and complementary assets against such events. No insurance markets 
emerge to insure against discoveries that are deemed unlikely to succeed by all except a 
knowledgeable entrepreneur (Knight, 1921).  Strategic flexibility becomes important in this case. 
Path-dependence and sustainable heterogeneity. As in Case A, entrepreneurs may start out 
with different bundles of resource attributes which gives rise to differential accumulation of 
knowledge. However, in a setting in which knowledge is non-blueprint (contrary to Case A), 
resource heterogeneity among entrepreneurs may be sustained and perhaps even increase. The 
reason is that an entrepreneur’s prior related knowledge provides him or her with a learning 
advantage and possible first mover advantages within the scope of his or her knowledge domain. 
Thus, the entrepreneur has an incentive to direct opportunity discovery efforts in directions that 
allow building on already accumulated knowledge.  
Economic organization. At the same time the entrepreneur also faces incentives to set up a 
productive operation by contracting with complementary resources on a longer-term basis 
(Casson, 1982; Alchian, 1984; Lipmann & Rumelt, 2003b). This makes economic sense to the 
extent that the idiosyncratic nature of the knowledge accumulated through resource learning 
processes makes it hard to trade on factor markets (Teece, 1982). The entrepreneur’s opportunity 
discovery will be influenced by resource learning stemming from these complementary 
resources. As more knowledge that is specific to these complementary resources is accumulated, 
the entrepreneur will come to value this particular bundle of resources higher than entrepreneurs 
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who do not posses the resource-specific knowledge. This may confer a factor market advantage 
(Barney, 1986) as the knowledgeable entrepreneur is able to take more resource attributes into 
account in the resource evaluation (Denrell et al., 2003). Heterogeneity is sustained because of 
advantages in opportunity discovery relating to the knowledge resources controlled by the 
entrepreneur.  
Case C: Positive Transaction Costs and Blueprint Knowledge 
Opportunity discovery. The presence of transaction costs “switches on” the resource 
learning and the appropriability mechanisms (these are not present in Case A and B). The 
presence of transaction costs implies that not all opportunities that would be value creating in 
Cases A and B will be exploited. First, transaction costs imply that property rights will be less 
secure and need protection. This negatively influences the net value that the entrepreneur expects 
to appropriate (Teece, 1986; Coff, 1997; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005). Thus, if contracts are 
imperfect because of transaction costs, other agents may capture parts of the surplus from a 
discovery. For example, a buyer may engage in hold-ups (Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1996) 
involving complementary assets that are necessary to the production or marketing of the 
discovery. Second, the appropriability risk from imitation becomes a concern. Third, costs of 
engaging in resource learning also limit constrain the set of opportunities relative to Case A and 
B.   
An implication of these points is that it now (in contrast to Case A and B) matters which 
entrepreneur (or firm) makes a particular discovery (even if the knowledge leading to the 
discovery is fully transferable). Some entrepreneurs may face transaction costs that other 
entrepreneurs do not face (to the same extent); for example, entrepreneurs may face differential 
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abilities to raise capital and access complementary resources, or face different costs of protecting 
property rights to discoveries or costs of resource learning.  
Value creation and appropriation. Overall, the presence of transaction costs harm value 
creation relative to Case A, first, because transaction costs dissipate value (Barzel, 1997), and, 
second, because many discoveries will not be made in the presence of transaction costs. The 
presence of transaction costs in itself may lead to opportunity discovery as entrepreneurs seek to 
reduce transaction costs to increase the value they can appropriate (Coase, 1988; Makowski & 
Ostroy, 2001). However, some transaction costs will remain. Whether the presence of transaction 
costs is more harmful to value creation than non-blueprint knowledge (i.e., Case B) cannot be 
established on apriori grounds.   
The presence of transaction costs has several distinct strategic implications to firms in the 
context of opportunity discovery. First, value appropriation depends on the transaction costs 
firms face of delineating and enforcing property rights to resource attributes. Thus, when looking 
for resource attributes that may yield a competitive advantage, entrepreneurial firms must 
consider what are the costs of  keeping these attributes rare (and non-imitable), as well as 
protected from other types of value capture (Chi, 1994; Foss & Foss, 2005). Second, transaction 
costs introduce strategic hazards in the form of externalities that negatively impact resource 
values. For example, low quality producers may threaten established high quality levels. In this 
situation, entrepreneurial firms may become more dependent on complementary resources that 
can credible signal their intentions to important stakeholders (Akerlof, 1970; Klein & Leffler, 
1981). For entrepreneurial firms that direct opportunity discovery towards the quality dimension, 
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it is therefore a strategic challenge to acquire the relevant complementary resources and to direct 
opportunity discovery towards areas in which they are able to put these resources to use.  
Path-dependence and sustainable heterogeneity. In Case C resource heterogeneity 
emerges endogenously from discovery, but for reasons different from those mentioned in Case B. 
Transaction costs make some of the resource attributes discovered by entrepreneurs non-tradable. 
Some types of resource attributes are less likely to be tradable, such as new uses of capabilities, 
brand name capital, reputation and culture (Dierickx & Cool, 1989); entrepreneurs face 
incentives to utilize these themselves by engaging in opportunity discovery in areas related to 
these resources (Denrell et al., 2003). This gives rise to path-dependency, ultimately induced by 
transaction costs (cf. also Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999).  
 Economic organization. In a setting with transaction costs, the process of opportunity 
discovery will be organized in a way that minimizes transaction costs. Transaction costs create 
incentives for the entrepreneur to own resources rather than to rely on contractual delineation and 
enforcement of property rights to newly discovered resource attributes. Resource ownership 
confers a bundle of rights, including rights to hitherto undiscovered attributes of the relevant 
resource. An entrepreneur may prefer to acquire ownership of a resource rather than acquire a 
specified, finite list of rights to resource attributes. The reason is that resource ownership is a 
low-cost means of allocating the rights to resource attributes that are discovered by the 
entrepreneur/owner. In a well-functioning legal system, resource ownership usually implies that 
the courts will not interfere with an entrepreneur/owner’s exploitation of new attributes.  There is 
also an incentive effect on opportunity discovery of resource ownership: ownership implies a 
legally recognized right to the income of that resource, including the right to income from 
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discovered attributes. Moreover, resource ownership may economize with costs of enforcing 
property rights, because owning rather than contracting over attributes can make imitation of a 
discovery more costly to would-be imitators (cf. Teece, 1986; Liebeskind, 1996). Note in passing 
that these rationales of ownership go beyond those discussed in the economics literature (e.g., 
Barzel, 1982, 1997; Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1995), but makes sense in a dynamic economy in 
the context of opportunity discovery.   
 When an entrepreneur takes ownership of resources this is tantamount to forming a firm 
(Knight, 1921; Foss & Klein, 2005). Strictly speaking, however, it need not be the entrepreneur 
who sets up a firm or acquires complementary resources as, under the assumptions of the present 
case, the entrepreneur’s knowledge may be transferred to another entrepreneur, depending on the 
transaction costs of doing this. Conceivably, the entrepreneur may face high transaction costs in 
establishing ownership to the preferred bundle of resources and in establishing a firm governance 
structure. For this reason the entrepreneur may prefer to transfer the relevant knowledge of a 
discovery to those who have lower transaction costs of setting up a firm. Transaction costs thus 
determine the organizational context of opportunity discovery, specifically whether the 
entrepreneur becomes an employee or an individual contractor.   
Case D: Positive Transaction Costs and Non-Blueprint Knowledge  
 Opportunity discovery. The final, and most realistic, case is the one where both transaction 
costs and differential ability to absorb knowledge are allowed to influence opportunity discovery. 
As in Case B, firms’ discovery activities will be path-dependent, because of differential 
accumulation of knowledge stemming from the non-blueprint nature of knowledge (Helfat, 1994; 
Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000). The difference is that the resource learning and the appropriability 
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mechanisms now both contribute to shaping paths of discovery. Several different scenarios can 
be conceived depending on how knowledge and these two mechanisms together influence 
opportunity discovery. For example, firms may be very favorably positioned vis-à-vis opportunity 
discovery in terms of their control of firm-specific knowledge resources and learning; however, it 
may be so costly to enforce discoveries (i.e., the appropriability mechanism) that advantages are 
offset. Or, resource learning may be so costly (e.g., forging contractual links with outside parties 
to access knowledge is very costly) that it swamps benefits from low costs of enforcing property 
rights.  
 The relative contribution of knowledge and the appropriability and resource learning 
mechanisms with respect to shaping opportunity discovery (as well as their interaction) requires 
more analytical attention than can be given here. However, what influences opportunity 
discovery in actuality is likely to be industry-specific. Evolutionary economists and students of 
technological change (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986; Helfat, 1994; Cohen & Klepper, 
1996) argue that industry-level technological change is shaped by technological opportunities and 
appropriability regimes and their interaction, but that these forces differ across industries. 
Similarly, whether knowledge or the two transaction cost mechanisms are the primary 
antecedents of opportunity discovery is likely to be industry-specific. For example, rather strong 
intellectual property rights protection characterizes the pharmaceutical industry, and this gives 
the appropriability mechanism a form that is different from the form it takes in industries with 
weaker appropriability regimes, such as the music industry.  
 Value creation and appropriation. As firms discover opportunities along paths of 
discovery that are shaped by both firm-specific knowledge and transaction costs, the resulting 
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heterogeneity in discovery may translate into long lasting differences in appropriable value 
creation across firms. What has been said above about value creation and appropriation under 
Case B and C also applies here.  
 Path-dependence and sustainable heterogeneity. Transaction costs and differential 
knowledge reinforce one another in the creation of resource heterogeneity and path dependency. 
Prior related knowledge directly constrains the learning processes, because it directs search and 
experimentation in certain directions as well as provides entrepreneurs with certain heuristics for 
problem-solving. This will produce sustained heterogeneity (when knowledge is non-blueprint). 
The presence of transaction costs reinforces such heterogeneity. First, as transaction costs make 
some opportunities unattractive (because property rights cannot be sufficiently enforced), some 
resource attributes will not be explored and entrepreneurs will not build knowledge relative to 
these. Second, transaction costs and knowledge directly interact in shaping the resource learning 
processes. That is, there are knowledge and transaction costs implication of organizing resource 
learning processes. Transaction costs exert an influence because there are costs of searching for, 
exploring, accessing, and combining resource attributes to try out new combinations (Teece, 
1982; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Matsusaka, 2001), and these costs constrain resource learning 
because they constrain what resource combinations can be tried, and what resource attributes that 
will be examined. An implication for theory, which so far has been unexamined in strategic 
management, is that transaction costs play a key role in the formation and development of 
capabilities.  
 Economic organization. Transaction costs and resource learning interact in providing a 
rationale for ownership and firm organization. Entrepreneurs have incentives to own resources 
 28
because of the costs of trading accumulated knowledge and for the “speculative” reason that 
resource ownership confers property rights to discovered resource attributes to the resource 
owner. Firms as governance structure emerge in order to reduce the costs of protecting against 
imitation and other types of rent capture, such as shirking and hold-up (Liebeskind, 1996). 
However, the extent to which firms are needed in order to protect against imitation differs from 
Case C. In Case D entrepreneurs have different abilities to absorb knowledge, creating a barrier 
to imitation. Differences among entrepreneurs with respect to their knowledge bases likewise 
influence their incentives to imitate competitors’ resource bundles, as they do not see the same 
opportunities for discovery of new attributes as those who have the relevant knowledge (Denrell 
et al., 2003). Thus, we should expect to see not only more sustainable heterogeneity among 
entrepreneurs in this setting compared to Case C, but also less non-market economic 
organization.  
 A further rationale for firm organization is that firms emerge as means of lowering the 
transaction costs involved in resource learning. Resource learning may require that the 
entrepreneur have to enter into collaboration with firms who control complementary knowledge 
that costly to transfer. Organizing experimental processes involving combination and 
recombination of resource attributes across markets requires continuous costly re-negotiation 
among resource owners. Moreover, asset specificity may arise from such processes, giving rise to 
the familiar hold-up problem. Given this, part of the rationale of firms is that they can organize 
entrepreneurial learning processes in a transaction cost minimizing manner (for this argument, 
see Foss, 2001). Thus, contrary to Kirzner (1973), who is adamant that entrepreneurship may be 
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exercised independently of asset ownership and firm organization, there is a logical nexus 
between entrepreneurship, ownership and firms, namely when transaction costs are positive.  
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The key aim of this work has been to define a role for transaction costs and property rights along 
with experiential knowledge as antecedents of opportunity discovery and sustained advantage.   
The arguments lie in the intersection of the strategic management and entrepreneurship fields and 
contribute to both of these. In the following, the specific contributions to the two fields are briefly 
outlined.  
Contribution to the Resource-based View 
 Opportunity discovery, resource learning and transaction costs. Because it is the source of 
new value creation, opportunity discovery seems central to strategic management. In general, 
however, opportunity discovery has not been a prominent theme in strategic management 
research (but see, e.g., Hitt et al., 2001; Ireland et al., 2003). Thus, strategic management’s 
dominant perspective, the RBV, still has to find room for opportunity discovery in its theoretical 
edifice (but see Rumelt, 1987; Mosakowski, 1998; Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Alvarez & Barney, 
2004). Although there may be deep reasons why the RBV and the entrepreneurship field have 
lived somewhat separate lives ― such as differences in levels of analysis (firm vs. the 
entrepreneur)  ―,  many prominent scholars have rightly argued that understanding opportunity 
discovery is a pressing issue in strategic management (e.g., Hitt et al., 2001; Lippman & Rumelt, 
2003b; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Denrell et al., 2003).  
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 The present work contributes to overcoming the schism in a number of ways. First, 
concerning the differences concerning levels of analysis, the analysis here suggests that what is 
the relevant level is partially dependent on transaction cost considerations: if such costs are zero, 
the entrepreneur is unambiguously the relevant level, as firms have no rationales of existence. 
However, to the extent that transaction costs cause learning and capabilities to be internalized in 
firms, firms become the relevant level of analysis for opportunity discovery. Second, the paper 
links the key entrepreneurship construct of opportunity discovery to RBV notions of resource 
heterogeneity and learning. While others have linked opportunity discovery to resource learning 
(Penrose, 1959; Mahoney, 1995; Helfat, 1997; Foss, 2001; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Stieglitz & 
Heine, 2007) and transaction costs to the RBV (e.g., Coff, 1999; Foss & Foss, 2005; Kim and 
Mahoney, 2006), the specific contribution of this work is to introduce transaction costs and 
property rights as important antecedents of opportunity discovery in the context of a resource-
based view. Transaction costs moderate the relation between knowledge and opportunity 
discovery, and they influence the costs of engaging in resource learning. For this reason, 
transaction costs matter to understanding which resource attributes entrepreneurial firms will 
explore, and which firms will explore which resource attributes.   
 Path-dependence and resource endogeneity.  Transaction costs furthermore matter to the 
understanding of how heterogeneous resources emerge from resource learning, and how resource 
heterogeneity may be sustained ⎯ both key issues in a dynamic RBV (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). 
Knowledge-based differences among entrepreneurs are likely to create long lasting differences in 
entrepreneurial discovery activities when knowledge gained from resource learning possesses 
cumulative and path-dependent characteristics. This can lead to firm-specific trajectories of 
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learning that result in continuous identification and exploitation of opportunities and are rent-
yielding along the trajectory. Helfat (1994, 1997) describes such trajectories for the US petroleum 
industry. Some of the knowledge that underlies a path of resource learning is tied to a firm-
specific context (Kogut & Zander, 1992), because of the high transaction costs to outsiders of 
accessing it. For example, it has been argued that knowledge embedded in capabilities and 
culture is often costly to competitors to access and imitate (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), and 
prohibitively costly to trade on factors markets.  In other words, transaction costs may play a key 
role in the creation of sustained heterogeneity and therefore sustained advantage.  
Contributions to Entrepreneurship Research 
 In an influential paper, Shane and Venkataraman (2000: 218) argued that although 
entrepreneurship provides research questions for many fields in management, strategy and 
organization scholars are fundamentally concerned with three sets of research questions, namely 
why, when and how 1) entrepreneurial opportunities arise; 2) certain individuals and firms and 
not others discover and exploit opportunities, and 3) different modes of action are used to exploit 
those opportunities (including the issue of “… how the exploitation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities are organized in the economy,” p.224). The distinctive contribution of this work is 
to proffer new answers informed by the EPR and the RBV to these important research questions.  
The emergence of entrepreneurial opportunities. With respect to the first question, how 
entrepreneurial opportunities arise, we have pointed to the important role of transaction costs and 
property rights in understanding how entrepreneurial opportunities arise. At a very fundamental 
level, transaction costs are at the heart of entrepreneurship: The presence of transaction costs 
means that there cannot be a full set of contingent forward markets, as in the full intertemporal 
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general equilibrium model of Debreu (1959) (Radner, 1968). The intertemporal coordination of 
present resource uses and future consumption is undertaken by the entrepreneurial function, that 
is, by engaging in the discovery of intertemporal opportunities (Knight, 1921). At a simpler level, 
the reduction of transaction costs may in itself constitute an entrepreneurial opportunity, as when 
firms that come up with new contractual designs, new sorting mechanisms, etc. gain an 
entrepreneurial advantage (Makowski & Ostroy, 2001). However, a specific contribution of this 
work has been to link transaction costs to prior, mainly experiential, knowledge in opportunity 
discovery. Thus, transaction costs matter to opportunity discovery because, first, the experiential 
outcomes of processes of resource learning depend on the transaction costs of combining and 
recombining resource attributes, ascertaining the attributes of resources, etc., and, second, the 
transaction costs of enforcing property rights to discoveries influence the direction of search.  
The localized nature of entrepreneurial opportunities. Concerning the second research 
question outlined by Shane and Venkatamaran, that is, why, when and how certain individuals 
and firms and not others discover and exploit opportunities, this work suggests that there is an 
important transaction cost dimension to addressing the question. Traditionally, the 
entrepreneurship literature has pointed to such things as network position, personality traits, and 
⎯ increasingly ⎯ prior, experential knowledge as the critical antecedents. The literature on firm 
evolution and innovation similarly points to prior related knowledge as the critical antecedent. 
While not disagreeing with this view per se, a comprehensive understanding of the why, when 
and how of opportunity discovery must include transaction costs, because resource learning and 
the direction of search efforts are fundamentally impacted by transaction costs.  
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Modes of action for exploiting opportunities. With respect to the final research question, 
the why, when and how different modes of action are used to exploit opportunities, this work has 
developed the point that the exploitation of opportunities is fundamentally dependent on 
transaction costs. In particular, firms may arise not only for the reasons familiar from the 
organizational economics literature (Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1996), or to protect against 
imitation (Liebeskind, 1996), but also because they may be superior mechanisms for coordinating 
resource learning processes (Foss, 2001). A specific contribution is the argument that resource 
ownership may arise partly for transaction cost reasons and partly for speculative reasons: 
Entrepreneurs will assume ownership of resources which they expect to be rich in hitherto 
undiscovered but potentially valuable attributes because contracting over these attributes is too 
costly. This differs from the view prevalent in organizational economics, namely that ownership 
is an instrument of bargaining power that arises to minimize dissipation of value caused by hold-
up threats (Hart, 1995).   
Limitations and Future Work 
 As indicated by the example that introduced this paper, there is an important “macro” angle 
into opportunity discovery and resources: Changes in technologies, institutions, and legal regimes 
influence the matrix of property rights and transaction costs that firms face (Teece, 1986; North, 
1990; Williamson, 1996; Oxley, 1999). Our analysis implies that these changes impact 
opportunity discovery in predictable ways and have implications for sustained advantage. In this 
paper, we have sidestepped this macro angle in order to keep the analytical complexity at a 
manageable level. However, future work may theorize the links from macro change to 
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opportunity discovery.  Empirical work on this may utilize both qualitative as well as event study 
research methodologies.  
 Relatedly, there is an important micro dimension that has not been fully explored and 
developed. Thus, research indicates that firm organization impacts on entrepreneurship (Miller, 
1983). However, as we have conflated the entrepreneur and the firm we have not dealt with this 
issue. Insights on property rights and transaction costs would appear to be an important part of an 
inquiry into these issues (for an important beginning, see Alvarez & Barney, 2004). Other micro 
issues that have not been dealt with here include the more fine-grained aspects of the 
appropriability and resource learning mechanisms linking transaction costs and opportunity 
discovery. What transaction costs are relevant here, exactly? How does experiential knowledge 
interact with these mechanisms (cf. Argyres & Mayer, 2007)? Additional insight into these issues 
likely requires extensive, mainly qualitative, research. The aim of this paper has been to outline a 
framework for research into how transaction costs and property rights impact opportunity 
discovery and sustainable advantage, thereby linking entrepreneurship and strategic management 
research. 
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